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ABSTRACT 
GUAP – A STRONG USER AUTHENTICATION 
PROTOCOL FOR GSM 
Özer Aydemir 
M.S. in Computer Engineering 
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Ali Aydın SELÇUK 
January, 2005 
 
 
Traditionally, the authentication protocols for cellular phone networks have 
been designed for device authentication rather than user authentication, which 
brings limitations and restrictions on the functionality of the system. In this 
thesis we propose a user authentication protocol for  GSM (Global System for 
Mobile) based cellular phone networks. Our protocol permits the use of weak 
secrets (e.g. passwords or PINs) for authentication and provides certain 
flexibilities for GSM users. The simulation results on currently established user 
authentication protocols and GUAP are presented. Our proposal also has a 
capture resilience extension to disable captured cellular phones securely.  
 
Keywords: wireless network security, user authentication, GSM, strong 
password protocols, capture resilient 
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ÖZET 
GUAP – GSM İÇİN KUVVETLİ KULLANICI ASILLAMA 
PROTOKOLÜ 
Özer Aydemir 
Bilgisayar Mühendisliği, Yüksek Lisans 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Ali Aydın SELÇUK 
Bilgisayar Mühendisliği Bölümü, Bilkent Universitesi, Ankara 
Ocak, 2005 
 
 
Hücresel telefon ağları için asıllama sistemleri geleneksel olarak kullanıcı 
asıllaması yerine sistemin kullanımı üzerine kısıtlamalar ve sınırlar getiren 
cihaz asıllamalarını kullanmak üzere tasarlanmışlardır. Bu tezde biz kullanıcı 
asıllamasını GSM’e uygulayan bir protokol tasarladık. Bizim protokolümüz 
zayıf kullanıcı şifrelerinin kullanılmasına müsaade etmekte ve GSM 
kullanıcılarına çeşitli esneklikler sağlamaktadır. GUAP ve literatürdeki ana 
kullanıcı asıllaması protokollerinin similasyonları da aynı zamanda bu tezde 
yer almaktadır. Protokol aynı zamanda ufak bir değişiklikle çalınmalara karşı 
hesapların güvenliğini sağlayabilmektedir. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Kablosuz ağ güvenliği, kullanıcı asıllaması, GSM, 
kuvvetli şifre protokolleri  çalınmaya karşı dayanıklılık 
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1. Introduction 
 
When the door is invented, inventor shouted “Who’s that!” and the 
authentication has already taken place in human beings life. Messengers 
brought passwords with their messages to prove that they are a trusted entity of 
an ally, while an enemy was trying to eavesdrop the passwords or 
impersonating the messenger. Since that time we are living with three people: 
Alice, sender of the message, Bob, the receiver, Trudy –the impersonator or 
eavesdropper.  
 
Since computer systems have became a part of our lives, authentication became 
a mandatory issue for all systems, and since authentication has become the part 
of computer systems, trudies have been trying to break the authentication. The 
weaknesses of authentication systems usually depend on the weaknesses of 
password holders, where they are able to hold weak passwords. The engineers, 
scientists and designers have two ways to follow. To make the authentication 
systems robust even if weak passwords are used, or to make the passwords 
robust even if weak authentication systems are used. The first solution brings 
the strong authentication password protocols, and the second solution brings 
the device authentication systems, where devices replace user entities. Both 
schemas have advantages and disadvantages; first solution comes with extra 
computational costs where second solution takes out the flexibility of the 
systems. 
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Wireless communication systems have special importance in computer 
systems. They all are new technologies and may have undiscovered 
weaknesses. They are transmitting data over the air which is easy to eavesdrop 
and with cellular mobile phones they all are spread all over the world. Also 
usually wireless mobile systems have limited capability of computation with 
their limited computation power and energy.  
 
Mobile telephone networks are becoming more popular everyday, and the 
Global System for Mobile (GSM) is the most commonly used standard for 
mobile communications with more than one billion users worldwide [6]. GSM 
defines the services, functional/subsystem interfaces, and protocol architecture 
for digital mobile radio networks. Identity of a GSM subscriber is established 
by the subscriber identity module (SIM). For authentication, GSM relies on a 
symmetric encryption key embedded in the SIM card [3, 8, 19]. 
 
Those restrictions force the wireless system designers to use device 
authentication instead of user authentication. In the scope of thesis the strong 
user authentication protocols will be analyzed and a new strong user 
authentication protocol for GSM will be introduced with the experimental 
results on mobile phones, also some extensions like end-to-end encryption for 
cellular phones and a precaution for loss of cellular phones will be introduced.  
1.1 Problem Description 
 
One of the reasons for preferring device authentication in GSM rather than user 
authentication is humans’ inability to remember strong secrets. Human users 
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tend to choose weak secrets such as short pins, dictionary words, and birthdays 
as passwords, which are vulnerable to dictionary attacks. However using 
device authentication in a cellular mobile network brings some restrictions to 
the users. All users are defined by a SIM card, which holds a strong 
cryptographic key for the user.  
 
The idea of including user authentication in GSM system is the main 
motivation of this thesis. Cellular phones are easy to eavesdrop and if user 
authentication is used in those phones, the authentication scheme has to be 
resistant to dictionary attacks. The main solution to this problem is strong 
password protocols, but they are computationally demanding on both client and 
server sides. In this work we studied modifying the strong password protocols 
in order to reduce the computational cost on client side while staying resistant 
against attacks.  
 
We present a new strong authentication protocol for GSM that allows using 
weak user secrets rather than embedded strong keys. Allowing user dependent 
keys breaks the dependency to SIM card and brings some flexibility such as 
redirection of calls, reaching accounts or disabling stolen cards without 
interacting with the operator of the service provider without the need of SIM 
card. Another problem for mobile phone users is the loss or stealth of the 
mobile phone, we make our proposal capture resilient that provides revocation 
of the lost phone. Also in this thesis some useful extensions to mobile 
authentication systems will be proposed as easy capture resilience. The 
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analysis and proposals are supported with the simulation results on mobile 
phones. 
 
The notations common to the rest of the paper are as follows: 
Πi : Password of user i, 
Ex{p}: Public key encryption of plaintext p with the key of x, 
K{p}: Symmetric key encryption of plaintext p with key K. 
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2. Related Work 
 
2.1 Evaluation of Authentication  
 
Before explaining the proposed strong password protocols, we would like to 
show the evolution of the password protocols. The first approach is so naïve 
that receiver asks, “Who’s that?” and Alice gives the plain password. In that 
case eavesdropper easily gets the password and authentication is only one way, 
 
Alice ? Bob: Password of Alice 
 
Next approach is to hash the password in order to hide it from eavesdropper. 
Alice gives hashed password instead of plain text and Bob applies the same 
hash function to the password; if two values are equal then authentication is 
done. Still authentication is one way and now eavesdropper can use the hashed 
password instead of password also if he wants to get the plain password, 
checks all dictionary words in a short time to find the corresponding password, 
which gives the same hash output.  
 
Alice ? Bob: H(Password of Alice) 
 
In order not to send only hashed password through channel a challenge-
response method is used. Alice sends a random number called ‘challenge’ to 
Bob, Bob encrypts the challenge of Alice with password (or hashed password) 
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and send it with his challenge. Alice decrypts her challenge sent by Bob and 
checks whether encryption is correct or not if it is correct then sends Bob’s 
challenge back encrypted with password. In that case mutual authentication is 
achieved, but the scheme is still vulnerable against dictionary attack. Trudy 
sends a challenge as Alice to Bob. Bob encrypts it and sends back to him. Then 
Trudy closes the connection and starts to decrypt the message of Bob with 
dictionary words, when he finds the correct challenge then the password guess 
is correct. 
A
LI
C
E BO
B
ChallengeA
H(P){ChallengeA} ,ChallengeB
H(P){ChallengeB}
 
Figure 1. Challenge Response Protocol 
 
2.2 Strong Password Protocols 
 
Since the authentication protocols evolve against dictionary attacks, there are 
two options to make them resistant: to make the password complex in order not 
to be in a dictionary, or to make the protocol not leak any information to the 
Trudy. The first option comes with the basic solution called device 
authentication, second option needs more complex approach called strong 
password protocols and since 1992, network security specialists are working on 
it.  
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Assume that two parties Alice and Bob try to establish a secret, authenticated 
session key for their communication. The only secret they share is a user 
password Π, which is vulnerable to dictionary attacks. The aim of strong 
password protocols is to authenticate the user while protecting the password 
against dictionary attacks by online eavesdroppers. Two early works in this 
category are the Encrypted Key Exchange (EKE) protocol of Bellovin and 
Meritt [1] and the protocol of Gong et al. [5]. Both protocols aim to 
authenticate the parties of communication and protect the user’s password 
against eavesdroppers.  
 
EKE is protecting the weak secret by encrypting it by using a public key 
cryptosystem. In 1993 they published the Augmented EKE (or A-EKE) 
protocol, which protects the weak password against server database disclosure, 
in the same year Gong et al. [5] presented a new approach to the protecting 
poorly chosen secrets from guessing attacks, which also depends on the public 
key cryptography. Jablon [9] presented simple password exponential key 
exchange (SPEKE), which uses Diffie-Hellman method for strengthen the 
weak secret. In 1997 Lucks [14] presented the open key exchange (OKE) that 
prevents the client to regenerate public, private key pairs per session. In 1998 
T.Wu [23] presents secure remote password (SRP), which uses asymmetric key 
exchange (AKE). In 2000 MacKenzie found a flaw in OKE and brought some 
constraints on choosing public key. In 2001 Perlman and Kaufman [18] present 
the password-derived moduli (PDM), which decrease the computations on the 
server side. In 2002 Zhu et al [24] presented an authentication method for 
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restricted devices, the solution is based on OKE except, they changed the 
protection part.  
 
2.2.1 Encrypted Key Exchange 
 
The Encrypted Key Exchange (EKE) [1] protocol provides secure 
authentication between user and a server using a weak secret. The protocol 
based on the combination of symmetric and asymmetric cryptography.  The 
main idea is to hiding the weak secrets by hardening it with a public key 
cryptosystem. The protocol is a generic protocol, which suits for all known 
public key cryptosystems including RSA, Diffie-Hellman, El Gamal.  The 
protocol generates a strong session key at the end of the protocol and rest of the 
communication uses this session key for securing the system. There are two 
main classes of the EKE protocol; one based on public key encryption, the 
other on Diffie-Hellman key exchange. 
 
A
LI
C
E BO
B
R(ChA)
 A(EA)
 A(EA(R))
R(ChA, ChB)
R(ChB)
 
Figure 2.  Encrypted Key Exchange Protocol with public key encryption 
 9
 
The protocol in Figure 2 illustrates the EKE protocol with public key 
encryption. Here ΠA is the password of Alice, EA is the public key generated 
by Alice per session, R is a symmetric session key generated by Bob. Alice, 
who wants to authenticate herself to Bob, generates a public-private key pair 
for the current session and encrypts the public key with the password and sends 
it to Bob. Bob, knowing the password ΠA, decrypts the message and obtains 
the public key. He then generates a random secret R, encrypts it with the public 
key EA and Alice’s password, and sends it to Alice. Alice decrypts the message 
to get session key R, and they carry out a challenge-response protocol to 
authenticate each other. EKE is a generic protocol and can be used with any 
public key scheme with minor modifications. Even though EKE is a secure 
user authentication protocol with weak secrets, generating per session public-
private key pairs and doing private key operations on client side make it 
infeasible to use with computationally restricted devices.  
 
2.2.1.1 RSA-EKE 
 
An RSA public key pair is (e, n), where e is the exponent for encryption and n 
is the modulus, which is product of two large primes. In RSA-EKE, n shouldn’t 
encrypted with password, because eavesdropper may decrypt Π{e,n} with 
candidate password Π′ and check whether n is a valid RSA public key modulus 
(if it is prime or has more than two factors, it is absolutely invalid). If n is 
invalid Π′ is incorrect (eliminated from the candidate list). Also e is always 
odd, if decryption with candidate passwords results on an even e then the 
candidate passwords is eliminated, so encryption function should add one in 
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the probability of %50, in order not to leak any information about weak 
password Π. 
 
El Gamal and Diffie Hellman methods are also proposed with EKE [1] 
different than RSA-EKE. 
2.2.2 Augmented Encrypted Key Exchange 
 
EKE is secure against dictionary attacks but because of making operations with 
plain password, it is not resistant against password database disclosure.  
Belovin and Merit [2] proposed a new solution against this problem called 
Augmented-EKE or A-EKE. A-EKE uses hashed password instead of plain 
one in protocol and keeps the hashed value of passwords in server database.  
A
LI
C
E BO
B
A, H(  )(E)
H(  ) (E(R))
R(Cha)
R(Cha, Chb )
R(Chb)
 
Figure 3. Augmented EKE Protocol 
 
Bob stores the H(Π) as the verifier of the password where g is a generator in 
the Zp
* . By this modification A-EKE is a secure authentication protocol for 
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weak secrets against eavesdroppers, impersonators and database disclosure 
doesn’t result in plaintext passwords anymore. 
 
 
2.2.3 Protocol of Gong et al. 
 
After EKE was proposed, Gong et al. [5] proposed a different solution to 
strong authentication with user passwords. The solution contains a third party, 
which is a trusted center as in Kerberos. The parties in the system authenticate 
each other by the help of the trusted server. In the protocol below, unlike EKE, 
there is no need for generating public/private key pair per session, but there is a 
need for a trusted server whose public key is known by all parties. 
A
LI
C
E BO
B
 A(nA1, nA2   k),    B(nB1, nB2   k)
SE
R
VE
R
Esrv{nb1, nb2,cb,   B{tB}}
Esrv{na1, na2,ca,   A{tA}}
k(rb)
Esrv{na1, na2,ca,   A{tA}}, rA
 A(nA1, nA2   k), k(ra), rb
 
Figure 4. Gong et al.’s protocol 
 
In the protocol above Alice wants to communicate to Bob through an 
authenticated channel. Alice generates three random numbers nA1, nA2, and cA, 
and encrypts the timestamp with her password ΠA then she encrypts all with 
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the public key of the server and sends them to Bob with a random challenge rA. 
Bob generates the same message with his random numbers nB1, nB2, cB and 
timestamp tB, and forwards both messages to the server. The server decrypts 
both messages and by decrypting the ΠA{tA} and ΠB{tB} checks whether 
timestamps are fresh or not; if they are, server generates a session key for the 
session between Alice and Bob. Server masks the key of Alice and Bob, 
encrypts the nA1 (nb1) and masked session key with ΠA (ΠB) for them sends 
both messages to Bob. Bob forwards Alice’s portion. After decrypting their 
messages and getting the session key k, Alice and Bob carry out a challenge 
response protocol to authenticate each other. 
 
After Belovin and Merit proposed the EKE and Gong et al. proposed their 
protocol, several new strong password protocols are proposed. We will analyze 
them in the following subsections. 
 
2.2.4. SPEKE 
 
The SPEKE proposed by Jablon [9], is a variant of Diffie Hellman A-EKE, 
however instead of generator g, SPEKE uses a function F(s) where s is the 
weak secret. Also SPEKE does not use any symmetric encryption.  
 
According to the proposal, F function should be chosen carefully, in order not 
to leak any information about password. Offered candidate functions for F(S) 
are gS mod p; Sp-1/q mod p where q is an order of a generator in Gp; gq
S mod p 
where gq is an element of order q; where p and q are large primes and q|(p-1). 
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A
LI
C
E BO
B
f(  )ra mod p
f(  )rb mod p
K(Cha)
K(Cha, Chb )
K(Chb)
K = H(f( ) rarb )
K = H(f( ) rarb )
 
Figure 5 SPEKE Protocol 
Π is hidden in the public key so that there is no need to use password as a key 
in symmetric key operation. Session key is also a function of password and 
both sides’ public key. The same challenge response schema is used as in EKE.  
 
2.2.5 SRP 
 
 In 1998, Thomas Wu [23] proposed Secure Remote Password Protocol (SRP), 
SRP is based on the computation of strong key in two different (and 
equivalent) ways. There are four functions called S, R, P, and Q. The strength 
of the protocol is based on the calculation of key K = S(R(P(w), P(x)), Q(y, z)) 
= S(R(P(y), P(z)), Q(w, x)). A set of candidate functions are given by Wu: 
P(x) = gx 
Q(w,x) = w +ux 
R(w, x) = wxu 
S(w,x) = wx 
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SRP Protocol 
Server stores a verifier per user and a salt. v = gH(Π,s) 
At the beginning of the protocol server sends the salt to the user 
• Alice ? “Alice” 
• Bob ?  Sends her salt s 
• Alice ? computes v and generates ‘a’(nonce) and sends ga 
• Bob ?generates ‘b’ (Bob’s nonce) Computes B = v + gb sends B, 
random u 
• Both calculates S = gab+ubx 
• Challenge response occurs. 
Why B = v + gb 
If instead of B = v + gb  B = gb is used then Imposter of server sends salt to 
Alice where she previously snooped. Alice sends ga, Impostor picks b and u 
Alice computes S = gab * gubx sends proof; Impostor alerts the failure and 
closes the connection. Impostor now has ga and b and proof of S. He chooses 
candidate password Π’, computes v’ and from the construction gets S’. If S’ 
matches with S then candidate password is correct.  
 
2.2.5.1 The role of u in SRP  
 
u is generated in 3rd message. Assume that it is not random and it is always 1 
(or known). If an intruder client who captured the v of Alice, impersonate 
Alice:  
• Impostor ? Alice 
• Bob ? s  
Impostor computes gav-u instead of ga  
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• Impostor ? gav-u  
• Bob = v+ gb 
• Impostor computes session key as 
– S =  (B-v)a mod n 
– Because Bob also generates same S because of wrong message 
sent in the 2nd message.  
 
2.2.6 OKE 
 
In RSA-EKE public key provides the freshness of the sessions, so it is 
mandatory to generate public-private key pair for each session, which increases 
the computation of the protocol. Lucks [14] proposed a new solution called 
Open Key Exchange in 1997. In OKE freshness are guaranteed with a random 
nonce generated through session and Bob (server) may use the same key pair 
for each session to each client. It will be suitable for client-server systems, 
where multiple clients want to authenticate to a server. As will be analyzed in 
security analysis chapter RSA-EKE and OKE is not resistant against e-residue 
attack, and author protects the protocol against e-residue attack by adding some 
extra turns to protocol. In 1999 MacKenzie, Patel and Swaminatham [16] 
found a new attack on protected–OKE. 
 
2.2.7 Zhu et al.’s protocol 
 
In 2000 Zhu et al.’s [24] protocol proposes a protocol which resembles to 
protected- OKE but uses a new method to protect the protocol against e-residue 
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attack. MacKenzie et al’s [16] solution to protected-OKE is infeasible for 
restricted devices, because of heavy public key operations, against this 
situation Zhu et al. come up with a new protection method called “interactive 
step”[24]. The step is basically relies on checking the correctness of RSA keys 
by testing it with random numbers. Receiver of the public key generates m 
random numbers and encrypts each of them with the public key and sends it to 
the generator of the keys. Generator decrypts the encrypted numbers and 
returns them to receiver, unfortunately this solutions comes with the extra 
public key encryption and decryption operations, which brings the 
computational cost. 
 
2.2.8 PDM 
 
Network security specialists usually work on decreasing the computational cost 
on the client side, in order to make the protocols suitable for restricted devices. 
Kauffman and Perlman [18] focused on the opposite direction and proposed a 
PDM (Password Derived Moduli) to decrease the computational costs on 
server side . PDM can be used for both mutual authentication or downloading 
secret information as private key. 
 
Basically server stores a prime number p, a random number B and the private 
information of client encrypted with client’s password. Prime number p is also 
generated from password in the user’s initialization. Alice chooses a random 
number A and sends 2A mod p to Bob. Bob calculates 2AB mod p and 2B mod p. 
Sends 2B mod p and multiplication of secret information with 2AB mod p to 
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Alice. Alice calculates 2AB mod p and gets her secret information. As authors 
stated the protocol is heavier than any other strong authentication protocol on 
client side, however it is so fast for server. So the protocol suits on 
applications, where server serves to large amount of powerful clients. 
 
2.2.9 Others 
 
Protocol for Capture Resilient Devices 
 
Disabling the key of captured mobile phone is another critical problem for both 
GSM operators and mobile phone users. MacKenzie and Reiter proposed a new 
scheme for the mechanism of secure key disabling [15].  The mechanism has 
two options: without key disabling and with key disabling. The first 
mechanism provides client to store its private key in the server and retrieve it 
when is needed. The second mechanism provides clients to sign a message, 
where both server and client have shares of the private key, second mechanism 
also support key disabling. 
 
Both mechanisms have a device initialization phase. Figure 6 illustrates the key 
retrieval protocol. In the initialization phase Alice defines two random numbers 
ν and a, calculates hashed password as b, defines c as f(ν, Π) ⊕ skdvc where 
skdvc is the private key of the client and  τ as Epksrv ({a,b,c}). The values ν, a, τ, 
pkdvc and pkserver are saved in the stable storage on the device, other values 
including skdvc, Π, b and c are deleted from the device.  
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During agreement Alice generates a random number ρ, and defines β as hashed 
password, encrypts both ρ and β with Bob’s public key as γ and defines δ as 
mac of γ and previously initialized τ, sends γ, δ, τ to Bob. 
Bob gets a, b and c from τ, checks the mac of γ and τ, gets ρ and β from γ 
checks whether β equals to b, mask c with ρ as η and sends it back to Alice. 
Alice unmask η and gets c and gets skdvc from it. 
 
Figure 6. Key Retrieval Protocol 
The second scheme is a signature protocol allowing key disabling. In the 
device initialization phase Alice initialize random numbers t, a, ν, defines u as 
h(t), b as h(Π) , d1 as f(ν,Π), d2 as d-d1 (where d is an RSA private key) and τ 
as EBob( {a,b,u, d2, N}) (where N is RSA modulus). The values t, a, ν, τ, pkAlice, 
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and pkBob are saved on the device, other values including u, b, d, d1,d2, Φ(N) 
are deleted.  τ and t are stored in other storable media and registered to the 
server in order to key disabling purpose. 
 
Figure 7. Signature Protocol with Key Disabling 
 
Figure 7 illustrates the protocol. During signature protocol Alice generates two 
random numbers r and ρ, defines β as h(Π),  γ as EBob ( m, r, ρ, β ) where m is 
the message to be signed and defines δ as mac of γ and τ. Alice sends δ, γ and τ 
to Bob. Bob gets a, b, u d2, N from τ, checks the mac of γ and τ, gets m, r, ρ, β 
from γ, checks whether β equals to b, if they equals then calculate md2  mod N 
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masks it with ρ and sends ρ to Alice. Alice gets d1 from password and ν, 
unmask ρ and calculates md1md2  mod N = md mod N. The message has been 
signed with Alice’s key where both party doesn’t have the exact d instead have 
its shares.  
 
Alice sends τ and t to the Bob, if the device is captured or lost. Bob gets u from 
τ  and checks whether h(t) is equal to u. If it is equal Bob disables the key of 
Alice.  
 
Kaliski and Warwick’s protocol 
 
Kaliski and Warwick proposed a new scheme for server-assisted strong key 
generation from user password [4]. Their solution is based on calculating the 
strong key with the help of a set of terminal clients. The proposed scheme 
assumes that the clients are mobile, but aren’t restricted on neither energy nor 
space. 
 
 
Both EKE and A-EKE give the flexibility to the designer by permitting to 
choose the public key cryptosystem. Diffie-Hellman, RSA and ElGamal are the 
three offered choices for public key operation in the protocol. SPEKE is 
designed for Diffie-Hellman, OKE uses the RSA for public key operations, 
SRP and PDM use discrete exponentiation. 
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There are still open problems in strong authentication with weak passwords. 
All the solutions depend on asymmetric cryptography and this brings the 
computational heaviness.  
 
The main aim to that problem is to use RSA and use small e for decreasing the 
computation in one side because of encryption with small e is much lighter 
than the decryption in RSA. However e-residue attack is a main obstacle 
against this solution and precautions against e-residue attack is a considerable 
issue for restricted devices. For those reasons, proposed strong authentication 
schemes are not suitable for restricted wireless clients.  
3. SECURITY ANALYSIS 
 
 
In the core of this thesis, we focus on the EKE, Gong et al’s protocol, OKE and 
Zhu et al’s protocol. This chapter analyzes the security of those protocols. 
 
3.1 Gong et al.’s Protocol 
 
 
In the first round of the protocol Alice generates na1, na2 and ca, and Bob 
generates nb1, nb2 and cb. They both put those random numbers in their first 
message to trusted server.  
 
Server passes the session key to Alice and Bob in the message of ΠA(na1, 
na2⊕k) and ΠB(nb1, nb2⊕k). If Alice or Bob connects to server through multiple 
connections na1, and nb1 provides the information of which session key k 
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belongs to which session. Also it brings the freshness guarantee for Alice and 
Bob.  
 
Usage of nb1 protects Alice’s password against Bob and both password against 
eavesdropper. If server passes key without blinding with na2 (or nb2) Bob may 
get the k from his portion and choose a candidate password ΠA′ from a 
dictionary and decrypts the Alice’s portion of the message, if he gets the same 
key k from Alice’s password then the password guessing is valid. Also 
eavesdropper may generate a dictionary of candidate password couples for 
Alice and Bob (with the size of N2 where N is the size of standard dictionary), 
with those candidate passwords eavesdropper decrypts the both ΠA(na1,k) and 
ΠB(nb1,k), if both decryption gives the same output then eavesdropper is 
successful on guessing passwords. 
 
Assume that ca and cb are not used on the protocol. If a previously used session 
key compromised and all message of the session is saved by eavesdropper then 
eavesdropper may chooses a candidate password ΠA′ and gets na1′ and na2′ with 
a guessed timestamp t′  Trudy may construct E(na1′,na2′,ΠA′(t′)) if a constructed 
message is equal to first message of the protocol then password guessing is 
correct. For this reason ca is used to protects to regeneration of first message by 
the help of the compromised key. 
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3.2 E-Residue Problem of RSA 
 
Public key cryptosystem for RSA has a public and private key pair of large 
natural numbers. Public key is (e, n): n is the product of two large primes p and 
q. Public exponent e is relative prime to φ(n) (where φ(n) = (p-1)*(q-1)). 
Private decryption key (d) is calculated by ed = 1 mod φ(n). 
 
A message m is encrypted by raising m to power of e on modulus n (c = me 
mod n) and decrypted raising cipher to power of d on modulus n (m = cd mod 
n). In RSA there are two domains of numbers: plaintext domain and ciphertext 
domain and the number of elements in both domains are equal to n. Encryption 
is a one-to-one and onto function from plaintext domain to ciphertext domain 
and decryption is a one-to-one and onto function from ciphertext domain to 
plaintext domain. 
 
The correctness of RSA is depends on the correctness of e*d = 1 mod φ(n). The 
same functions with the property of e*d = z mod φ(n) (where z > 1) breaks 
down the one-to-one and onto property of RSA. If e*d is equal to z instead of 
one, then encryption function covers only a subset of ciphertext domain, and if 
n is a combination of more than two primes that subset becomes smaller. 
 
E*d mod n p q d e subset size space size ratio
106 101 107 7102 3 101 10807 0.01
100 101 107 7100 3 107 10807 0.01
50 101 107 3550 3 161 10807 0.01
53 101 107 3551 3 302 10807 0.03
1 101 107 7067 3 10807 10807 1.00
Table 1. E-Residue results 
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If a message m is encrypted with a fake RSA key, then the encryption result 
always falls on the proper subset of ciphertext domain. If Alice encrypts the 
result of encryption with her password then Trudy choose a candidate 
password Π′ and decrypts the message, if encryption covers 1/t of the domain 
and candidate result falls in the same domain then password guess is 1-1/t 
percent correct. 
 
Table 1 shows an example of e-residue results on RSA. Results are taken with 
p = 101, q = 107, e = 3 and n = 10807. On each try corresponding d is 
recalculated. If e*d equals one then the subset space covers all of the space as 
expected. If it is equal to 106 subset space covers only %1 of total space, which 
means password guess is %99 percent correct. If the primes p and q increase 
into large numbers than more effective results can be found. 
 
First two message of the EKE are Π(EA) and Π(EA(R)), authors state that one 
of the encryption with password Π is redundant and only one encryption with 
password is sufficient. However RSA-EKE has a special property that second 
message must not be encrypted with password against E-residue attack.  
 
On the point of view of restricted devices, regeneration of per session RSA key 
pair is a costly operation for both restricted devices and server and also in 
cellular phone systems home location register (HLR) is a common over a wide 
area, whose public key may be known by all entities. For this reason 
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encryption of permanent public key with password is subject to dictionary 
attack and encryption of EA(R) is subject to e-residue attack. 
 
3.3 E-Residue and OKE 
 
Open key exchange is the first variant of EKE that eliminates the need of 
encrypting public key as desired in restricted devices. Figure 8 illustrates the 
Open Key Exchange Protocol, Alice and Bob agrees on a common secret Π. 
Alice generates an RSA key pair and a message m and sends m and public key 
(e,n) to Bob. Bob creates a random numbers a and µ. Calculates p as a hash of 
e, n, m, µ, Π and q = E(a)*p sends µ, q to Alice. Alice calculates p in the same 
way, and gets a′ from q computes r = h1(a′) and sends r as a response of getting 
correct a. Bob checks the response of Alice, calculates session key as k = h2(a)  
and his response as t = h3(a) where h1, h2 and h3 are different hash functions. 
Sends the response t to the Alice. Alice checks the response and if it is correct 
then calculates session key and Alice and Bob start to communicate in secure 
session with key k. 
AL
IC
E BO
B
(e,n), m
 , q
r
t
q = E(a)*p
p = H(e,n,m,   ,  )
p = H(e,n,m,   ,  )
a'  = D(q /p)
k= h2(a), t= h3(a)
k= h2(a)
 
Figure 8. Open Key Exchange Protocol 
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3.3.1 E-residue Attack on OKE 
 
An impostor may impersonate Alice and send a fake {e,n} pair where e.d is not 
equal to one. Bob calculates q and sends q and µ to impostor. Impostor closes 
the channel. And choose a candidate password Π′, computes candidate p′ and 
gets E(a). If E(a) is a member of subset domain then password guess is 
probably correct (with high probability) else password guess is wrong.  
 
Solution to that the author proposal is adding a protection calculation on µ 
before the first message of Bob. Instead of µ Bob generates µ-1 and µ0, and 
computes µi = E(µi-2.H(µi-1)) and sent back µk-1 and µk. Uses both µ-1 and µ0 in 
the calculations of p. Alice has to make k correct RSA decryption operation in 
order to get correct values of µ-1 and µ0.  
 
Lucks solution remained valid until MacKenzie, Patel, Swaminatham [16] 
broke the protection calculations in 1999. For instance if attacker chooses e as 
3, n is a large prime and e is relatively prime to n-1. Bob calculates p and sends 
out q, µk-1 and µk. In order to cover µs until µ2 and µ1. Attacker will decrypt µi  
by solving three cubic roots of µi . Then will multiply each root with H(µi-1)-1 to 
get the three possible solution for µi-2 . Only one of the solutions will be cubic 
residue over n. Intruder can easily identify the cubic residue by µi-2 n-1/3 ≡ 1. µ-1 
and µ0 are random so it is impossible to eliminate candidates, however they are 
only nine pairs of (µ-1, µ0). If for all pairs all possible solutions for E(a) is not a 
cubic residue then password guess is absolutely wrong. 
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MacKenzie et al. [16] proposed a new mechanism instead of Luck’s solution, 
however their system forces e to be a large number, which is not suitable for 
restricted devices. 
 
Zhu et al. [24] proposed a new variant of OKE in 2000. Their protocol is 
equivalent to standard OKE but the protocol has a new round called 
“interactive step”. In interactive step Bob sends m numbers each encrypted 
with e and asks to Alice to retrieve the numbers. Authors advice that m should 
be about twenty, however in that case Bob makes m extra RSA encryption and 
more importantly Alice makes m extra RSA decryption, which is an undesired 
situation for restricted systems. 
 
3.4 Solutions To E-Residue Problem 
 
There are two alternatives of the system that we found. The first one is on 
calculation of q. Instead of calculating q as E(a)*p, Bob may calculate q as 
E(a*p). In that case if e,n are fake RSA keys than q will always be in the e-
residue subset and leak no information about password. However in that case if 
Trudy impersonates Bob, he will attack on password. Trudy sends a random 
number x instead of q. Alice calculates a fake a′ and responds to Trudy. Trudy 
closes the connection and creates a candidate p′ from password, and from the 
response tries to extract p from x. For this reason this solution may be used if 
and only if Bob cannot be impersonated. 
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The second solution is about to harden the e-residue attack. Instead of 
calculating q as E(a)◊p, Bob calculates q as E(E(a)*p). In that case q will be 
always in e-residue subset, if key pairs are fake. If e-residue subset is 1/tth of 
the ciphertext domain, then there would be on average t candidate E(a)*p. In 
that case for all t candidate decryption intruder has to check whether E(a) is in 
the e-residue subset or not. If all E(a)s are out of the set password guess is 
incorrect otherwise, it may be correct or not. In that case elimination of 
candidate password is much more hard.  
 
Both RSA-EKE and OKE are vulnerable against e-residue attack. EKE 
prohibits the Π(E(R)) operation on RSA version. OKE provides a solution to 
the e-residue attack, which unfortunately needs several RSA operations on both 
client and server side and not secure as broken by McKenzie et al. Also Zhu et 
al. presents a solution to e-residue attack, which depends on the testing the 
correctness of generated public key pair. It is also inconvenient for restricted 
devices. 
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4. Wireless Security and GSM 
 
4.1 SECURITY ISSUES ON WIRELESS SYSTEMS 
 
Wireless systems contain all vulnerabilities of wired systems, plus they may 
have extra vulnerabilities according to their physical behavior. It is so easy to 
follow the information traffic without being spotted by the system owners. 
Everybody may capture the radio signals with the suitable equipments over air. 
Because of the wireless devices are usually mobile, they have less storage 
capability and memory. Also network bandwidth of the wireless systems is 
relatively smaller than wired systems. As a result, codes working on mobile 
devices should be located in a small portion of the hard drive and use less 
memory, also because of the less computation power cryptographic operations 
should be selected carefully. For the reason we stated above, elliptic curve 
cryptography suits on restricted mobile devices. Elliptic curve cryptosystem 
needs less storage and computation for equivalent security level than other 
alternatives like RSA. 
 
4.1.1 Security Issues on Mobile Phones 
 
In second generation systems (2G) authentication is much more important than 
privacy, because authentication is a mandatory issue in the standards; however, 
people usually don’t want to pay more for privacy. 
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First generation cellular systems are using Analog Mobile Phone Standard 
(AMPS). In the 2G systems this standard has some modifications on it and 
called New AMPS (or NAMPS). GSM is widely used especially in Europe and 
Australia, US commonly uses TDMA and CDMA (IS-41) (Time and Code 
Division Multiple Access). All the standards stated above use secret key 
operations in cryptographic functions. Two main reason of the non-usage of 
public key operations are: 
• The processors  of mobile devices are small and restricted. 
• The data transfer rate of the mobile devices is small 
KEYS 
 
GSM and IS-411 use secret key encryption and decryption in cryptographic 
operations. IS-41 keys are 64 bits and GSM keys are 128 bits. GSM derives 
session keys and authentication signatures from key, on the other hand IS-41 
generates two different shared secret data from key (SSD-A, SSD-B). SSD-A 
is used as authentication signature and SSD-B is used for session key.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Generation of SSD keys in IS-41 
                                                 
1 IS-41 is another cellular phone standard uses CDMA and popular especially in North America 
Cellular Phone 
Key 
Station 
CAVE 
SSD-A 
SSD-B 
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The CAVE function is a hash function that works by using a shift register 
driven over the input data and a somewhat random table, and shuffling the 
inputs. It takes 23 octets of input and produces 16 octets of output. The output 
of the CAVE functions are identity of the cellular phone, key of the client and a 
random number generated from station [20]. 
 
In GSM challenge-response processes are unique to operator and identity of the 
device (International Mobile Subscriber Identity –IMSI), key of the mobile 
client and cryptographic operations are embedded into a smart card called SIM 
card. Next chapter will analyze the authentication system of the GSM in 
details. 
 
4.1.2 Security in Handheld Devices 
 
The main vulnerability on hand held devices is impersonation. Handheld 
devices usually use device authentication, however, main precaution against 
impersonation is to use user authentication. Usually hand held devices 
authenticate user by personal identification number (PIN) that is typically a 
four digit number.  
 
Palms and PDAs are usually different then cellular phones, where they can 
work standalone and don’t need to authenticate themselves to a center or access 
point, however they may be extended in order to be a part of a network and to 
authenticate themselves to a station. Palm usually uses elliptic curve 
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cryptography in authentication. The key size is about 163 bits, which is as 
strong as 1024 bit RSA. [17] 
 
4.2 GSM 
 
In 1982 CEPT (Conférence Européene des Postes et Télécommunications) 
created the GSM (Groupe Spécial Mobile – Global System for Mobile) 
committee in order to specify the standard for the European cellular systems. In 
1988 GSM became a Technical Committee of European Telecommunications 
Standards Institute (ETSI). Initially GSM was established on 900 Mhz band, In 
1988 at the request of the United Kingdom a version of GSM, operating on 
1800 Mhz band, was included in the specification. A GSM protocol has three 
entities: Mobile Station, Base Station and Center.  
 
Mobile Station 
 
GSM subscribers use the mobile stations to make and receive calls. Mobile 
stations are the combinations of Subscriber Identity Mobile (SIM) and mobile 
equipment. SIM card is a smart card that is used to deploy subscriber identity 
into mobile equipment. Each SIM card contains the 15 digits International 
Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) number, the corresponding to the secret key 
of the subscriber, the cryptographic functions used in GSM (A3, A5, A8), and 
the language information of the mobile equipment. First three digits of the 
IMSI are the country code of the mobile (MCC). Next two digits are mobile 
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network code (MNC), remaining ten digits are the identification number of the 
mobile subscriber (MSIN).  
 
Base Station (Visiting Location Register-VLR) 
 
Mobile Subscribers communicate with a base transceiver station (BTS) over 
radio interface. Base station generally takes the up-link radio signals from MS 
and converts it into data for transmission to other machines within the GSM 
network and vice versa.  
 
GSM Operation Center (Home Location Register – HLR) 
 
The center is responsible for accepting mobile subscribers to the system, route 
the communications between mobile subscribers. HLR is a main database of 
subscriber information of the GSM operator. It interacts with mobile switching 
center, which is a center call and control processing [21]. 
 
The cellular phone systems have several security aspects. The first step of the 
aspects is to authenticate human subscriber to SIM card, then authenticate SIM 
card to GSM operator, and the last encryption of the communication.  
 
4.2.1 PIN Code Protection 
 
The most basic level of the protection in GSM is to protect the mobile device 
against fraudulent usage by a Personal Identification Number (PIN) code, 
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against illegal usage of stolen SIM cards. PIN takes a four to eight decimal 
digit code. SIM also has a second PIN property called PIN2 to activate certain 
features to the subscriber. After three incorrect attempts to PIN number, the 
SIM card will be blocked. There is a PIN unblocking key (PUK) which is also 
stored in the SIM. After 10 incorrect attempts to PUK, SIM card will be 
blocked permanently.  
 
4.2.2 GSM Authentication 
 
GSM contains three entities in a session: a mobile subscriber (cellular phone), 
visiting location register (VLR, base station), and home location register 
(HLR). Alice’s SIM card contains a secret authentication key KA and unique 
“International Mobile Subscriber Identity” (IMSI). A3, A5 and A8 algorithms 
are used in authentication, where A3 and A8 are one-way functions and A5 is a 
symmetric encryption function [8]. 
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A5(Kt, TMSI)
ACK
 
Figure 10. GSM Authentication Protocol 
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Figure 10 illustrates the authentication protocol of GSM for the first connection 
attempt of the mobile subscriber to a certain VLR. KA and Kt respectively are 
permanent and temporary key of Alice (mobile client). Alice sends her unique 
identity to VLR, VLR passes this identity to HLR in order to inform it that 
Alice wants to log in to the system. HLR generates a random number RAND, 
calculates temporary authentication key Kt for consecutive attempts2, and the 
security result SRES that is equal to KA and RAND encrypted with A5. VLR 
passes RAND to the mobile client and keeps Kt and SRES. Alice calculates 
SRES and sends it to VLR. If SRES sent by Alice is equal to SRES sent by 
HLR then VLR sends Kt and TMSI to the mobile client to be used in 
consecutive authentication attempts without the need of contacting the HLR. 
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Figure 11 Consecutive Connections to GSM 
 
In Figure 11, consecutive connections of the mobile client to the same VLR is 
shown. TMSI is the Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity given to the mobile 
client. Here, instead of IMSI, mobile client sends TMSI to VLR. VLR 
generates a random number RAND and sends it to the mobile client. Mobile 
                                                 
2 Kc is an output of A8 function seeded with Ki. 
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client calculates the new SRES with temporal key KT that it received in 
previous session.  
 
4.2.1.1 GSM Encryption 
 
After authentication of the mobile subscriber, the communications between the 
system and the subscriber must be protected against fraudulent access. This is 
provided by encrypting the data on the radio interface using a key Kc and the 
A5 encryption algorithm. There are up to seven variants of A5 and mobile 
subscriber and operator agree on one of the A5 algorithms [21]. 
 
4.2.1.2 Cryptographic Algorithms of GSM 
 
There are three common encryption algorithms used in GSM security: A3, A5, 
and A8. A5 is a stream cipher used for encryption in GSM, A3 and A8 are one-
way functions take place in the authentication phase. 
 
A3 algorithm is used by a GSM network to authenticate the mobile subscriber. 
It is a one way function implemented in the SIM [25]. 
 
The A5 is the algorithm used for encryption in GSM mobile phones. It can be 
used on both voice and data connections. It is a stream cipher that uses a 64-bit 
secret key.  A5 is designed to be efficiently implemented in hardware. 
There are two versions of the A5 algorithm: 
A5/1, which is used in Europe, and A5/2, which is used in export systems 
A8 is used to exchange a session key that can be used to encrypt voice or data. 
A8 is also one-way function implemented in SIM [25]. 
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5. GSM USER AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL 
(GUAP) 
 
In this section, we describe a new user authentication approach for GSM. The 
current GSM authentication scheme uses the device’s authentication key, 
which is embedded in the SIM card of the user. With the new approach, Alice 
can use her password instead of the embedded key. Using passwords instead of 
embedded keys breaks the dependency on the SIM card during authentication. 
Users will be able to reach their accounts without SIM cards, via any cellular 
phone, Internet, or a special network. Users can reach their address book, 
redirect their calls, or get their personal information without the need of either 
SIM card or giving their personal information to operators of the service 
provider. 
 
GSM authentication protocol resembles the approach of Gong et al. [5] in 
certain ways. Both schemes are based on three entities, and in both cases the 
third entity is a trusted server whose public key is known by all parties. Unlike 
Gong et al.’s protocol, in GSM authentication, VLR is an automated non-
human entity, which is able to remember strong secrets. Another difference is 
in regard to the use of timestamps. Clock synchronization may be a crucial 
problem in GSM authentication, which can be solved by generating random 
nonces for freshness guarantee of the sessions. 
 
Our protocol is illustrated in Figure 12. Mobile user wants to be authenticated 
to HLR via VLR, using her password Π. A random nonce, RAND, is generated 
by VLR per session and provides freshness guarantee for the session. Three 
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random nonces generated by the mobile client are n1, n2 and c; n1 proves the 
correct decryption of HLR in the fifth message, n2 masks the session key k, c 
protects the first message against replay by adversary. 
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Figure 12 GUAP Protocol 
 
The protocol starts with the client’s authentication request by sending its 
unique identity (IMSI) to VLR. VLR generates and sends a random number 
RAND to Alice. Alice generates three random nonces n1, n2 and c, and 
encrypts RAND with her password. She then encrypts n1, n2, c, and Π(RAND) 
with HLR’s public key and sends it to VLR with a random challenge rA. VLR 
takes the message and encrypts the HLR’s portion of the message and RAND 
with its symmetric key, and sends it to HLR. HLR, knowing VLR’s symmetric 
key, decrypts the message, then asymmetrically decrypt the message come 
from Alice, finally decrypts Π(RAND) to get RAND, if both RAND are equal 
then HLR is sure about VLR’s and Alice’s identities. HLR generates a session 
key for VLR and Alice, encrypts it with VLR’s symmetric key for VLR, and 
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encrypts the masked session key (n2 ⊕ k) and n1 with Alice’s password, then 
sends both messages to VLR. VLR decrypts its portion of the message to get 
session key k, encrypts the challenge rA with k sent by Alice in first message, 
forwards Alice’s portion of message with the response to her challenge and a 
new challenge rB. Alice decrypts the message coming from HLR and gets the 
session key k. She then responds to VLR’s challenge. In consecutive sessions 
Alice and VLR can use the generated session key k without need of re-
authentication.  
 
In the protocol, the existence of the correct n1 value in the fifth message 
indicates that it is the HLR that has decrypted the first message and sending 
this output. The random nonce n2 protects HLR’s response encrypted by Π 
against dictionary attacks on Π by an attacker who gets to know k or by VLR. 
The issue here is a dictionary attack by someone who knows k and hence can 
guess n1 and n2. Random c protects first message against regeneration by VLR: 
Again a malicious VLR or an adversary that has compromised a past session 
key k, can choose a candidate password Π′ and decrypt the message of mobile 
client to get candidate n1′and n2′. Without the confounder c, the adversary can 
generate a candidate first message. If the candidate message is equal to real 
message then the password guess is correct [5].  
 
In the protocol VLR is not a user entity so it can remember and perform its 
operations with its strong secret key Kvlr. This reduces the computational cost 
of Gong et al.’s protocol. The only asymmetric key operation done by the 
mobile client is a public key encryption in the first message. If RSA is used 
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here, then the public exponent of the key pair can be fixed to a small prime, 
reducing the computational cost on the client side. 
 
5.1 Extension for Key Disabling 
 
Loosing cellular phones is a common problem for users. The user has to 
disable his account against unauthorized usage. Current systems do not provide 
automatic key disabling after the loss of a cellular device. The user has to call 
the service provider’s operator and prove his identity to disable his SIM card 
and reveal his private information. In [15] MacKenzie and Reiter proposed a 
method for capture resilience in networked cryptographic devices where 
networked devices can sign or encrypt a message through an untrusted server 
without revealing its private key. Their protocol also provides a key disabling 
feature for captured devices. The approach assumes an untrusted server and 
this makes the protocol relatively expensive. In GSM authentication HLR is a 
trusted identity, hence capture resilience property can be achieved less 
expensively.  
 
Figure 13 Initialization phase for key disabling 
 
In the initialization of mobile client’s account, mobile client generates two 
random numbers t and c, takes the hash of t as u, and creates a key disabling 
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ticket τ as Ehlr (Π(u), c). Random c and u is deleted and t and τ is taken out of 
the phone to a storable medium. 
 
After a loss or capture occurs, user immediately sends τ and t to the HLR. HLR 
decrypts τ with its private key and decrypts Π (u) to get u. After getting u, 
HLR checks whether u is equal to h(t) or not; if they are equal then the account 
of the user is disabled for further access. In the ticket the random number c is 
for protecting the password against dictionary attacks on τ. If c does not exist, 
an adversary seeing t can generate u and encrypt it with a candidate password 
and the public key of the server. If it is equal to τ then the password guess is 
correct. 
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6. SIMULATIONS 
 
There are two main user authentication protocols for strong user authentication: 
EKE protocol and Gong et al’s protocol. OKE is an efficient variant of EKE 
where per session key generation is not necessary and client side may compute 
only lightweight RSA encryption, however it is proven to be vulnerable against 
e-residue attack. Zhu et al’s proposal is a variant EKE that resembles OKE, the 
only difference is the interactive protocol of Zhu et al’s protocol and designed 
for restricted devices. GUAP is a variant of Gong et al’s protocol that is 
specific to GSM and decreases the computation on VLR and mobile client. In 
order to show the practical results on the computation time of the protocols we 
have made a simulation on EKE, Gong et al’s protocol, Zhu et al’s protocol, 
OKE and GUAP. Following sections describe the protocol environment, used 
libraries, results and interpretation of the results. 
 
6.1 Environment 
 
The simulations are implemented in JAVA language. Server side modules are 
implemented by J2SE v1.4 the mobile client modules are implemented in 
J2ME 2.0. HLR and VLR codes run on Intel PIV 2.4 Ghz machine with 512 
MB RAM, mobile codes run on Sun Microsystems’s simulator KToolbar.  
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Figure 14 KToolbar Simulator: KToolbar is a mobile phone simulator, where developer 
may run their MIDP (Mobile information device profile) applications.  
 
Cryptography and Network Security API of J2SE hasn’t been ported to J2ME 
yet. For this reason cryptographic functions are used from the Bouncy Castle 
cryptographic API (www.bouncycastle.org) on both server and client side.  
6.2 Simulation Results 
 
All protocols are run for 22 times and computation times are recorded for 512 
and 1024 bit RSA keys.  JAVA calls the garbage collector in undefined periods 
and this may take extra times for this reason the worst and the best results are 
neglected for each simulation and others are presented because both J2ME and 
 44
J2SE calls garbage collector of the JAVA and this may effect the computation 
time of the protocol. Zhu et al’s protocol implemented to test ten numbers in 
interactive step, and OKE implemented to calculate µ10.  
6.2.1 Results on HLR 
 
HLR 512 bit 1024 bit 
  RSAEKE ZHU GONG OKE GUAP RSAEKE ZHU GONG OKE GUAP
  47 121 31 127 31 94 780 234 752 89
  16 126 31 99 15 78 812 219 778 120
  16 102 32 127 18 93 765 219 768 104
  15 126 31 97 15 78 780 203 782 73
  16 111 31 127 15 93 794 234 795 79
  16 111 32 127 0 78 761 203 820 120
  15 126 31 142 15 94 764 219 805 73
  0 141 47 123 0 109 760 203 787 89
  16 111 31 110 18 93 748 250 778 135
  16 142 16 112 15 78 789 218 773 89
  16 107 16 127 18 78 764 188 763 112
  15 94 31 140 0 109 748 203 783 73
  16 95 32 102 15 93 795 218 771 135
  15 109 47 95 31 93 795 188 751 73
  16 126 31 115 15 93 786 218 772 73
  16 110 31 127 31 79 789 235 761 89
  0 140 32 122 15 63 769 219 748 104
  16 109 31 120 16 94 821 234 779 120
  16 125 31 140 18 63 794 218 773 104
  16 110 16 120 15 78 760 235 783 120
Average (msc) 15.8 117.1 30.6 120 15.8 86.6 778.7 217.9 776.1 98.7
Table 2. Simulation Results on HLR 
 
The results on HLR stated in Table 2, RSA-EKE resulted to perform best on 
HLR, where GUAP comes second with a small difference; Gong et al’s 
protocol is about two times slower than GUAP. 
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Figure 15. Average Simulation Results on HLR 
Zhu et al’s protocol and OKE take more computational time than other 
protocols because of their precautions against e-residue attack, on both 
protocols server does extra RSA-decryption in order to prove the correctness of 
the sent RSA key pair. Gong et al’s protocol takes twice computation than 
GUAP on HLR, because in GUAP VLR is a non-user entity so 
communications between HLR and VLR do not need to use assymetric 
cryptography. This make HLR to compute one less RSA decryption in GUAP.  
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6.2.2 Results on VLR 
 
EKE, OKE, and Zhu et al’s protocol designed for two parties, only Gong et al’s 
protocol and GUAP have run on VLR. In GUAP VLR is a non-user entity 
where it can use symmetric key operations on authentication with its device 
key instead of public key operations with weak secret. For this reason it is 
much faster than Gong et al’s protocol on VLR. 
 
VLR 512 bit 1024 bit 
  GONG GUAP GONG GUAP 
  234 15 235 0 
  234 16 219 0 
  234 0 235 0 
  188 0 219 0 
  250 14 250 0 
  188 0 218 15 
  204 0 266 0 
  219 16 188 0 
  204 0 234 0 
  203 0 219 9 
  203 0 235 0 
  234 0 234 0 
  219 0 203 0 
  188 0 203 0 
  250 0 219 10 
  157 0 203 0 
  234 0 234 0 
  188 0 203 0 
  234 14 219 0 
  188 0 282 0 
Average (msc) 212.7 3.8 225.9 1.7 
Table 3 Simulation Results on VLR 
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The average results shown in Table 3 illustrate the benefit of using VLR’s 
secret key to avoid asymmetric operations. 
Protocol Performance on VLR
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Figure 16 Average Simulation Results on VLR 
 
The asymmetric encryption of the message in VLR makes Gong et al’s 
protocol slower than GUAP.  
6.2.3 Results on Mobile Client 
 
Mobile Clients are more sensitive on computation time than PC’s, their 
capacity is restricted both on memory and cpu and also usually their processors 
are using 16 bit architecture instead of 32 or 64 bit. As we stated above mobile 
clients are simulated on KToolbar, We also made simulations on Sony 
Ericcson’s and Nokia’s simulators and they gave similar results to KToolbar.  
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Mobile 512 bit 1024 bit 
  RSAEKE ZHU GONG OKE GUAP RSAEKE ZHU GONG OKE GUAP
  516 2053 109 2048 114 469 2010 246 2097 211
  500 1940 14 2017 112 610 2081 270 2161 282
  438 1787 132 2095 114 610 1996 258 2329 197
  579 1996 124 1748 113 610 2081 233 2021 216
  532 1940 124 2121 98 656 2095 232 1892 254
  515 2010 124 2054 84 360 2025 212 2187 222
  218 1968 116 1927 113 1015 1884 233 2235 240
  673 1947 99 2213 98 657 2026 257 2214 212
  468 2039 108 1982 98 687 2307 219 2227 198
  483 2108 117 2023 113 578 2376 246 2306 212
  236 2052 108 1835 98 515 2215 223 2017 198
  766 1969 116 2169 98 375 2207 223 2253 211
  859 1969 116 2105 98 657 2194 223 2237 193
  220 1968 97 1957 113 625 2103 270 2150 193
  547 1982 124 2027 99 625 2250 235 2278 198
  578 2095 108 2159 112 359 2208 234 2388 221
  296 2011 99 2173 113 360 2292 222 2205 225
  561 2108 99 1812 98 360 2147 223 1987 205
  625 2038 133 2007 112 1015 2165 234 2242 240
  280 1834 133 1712 105 718 2206 259 2165 196
Average (msc) 494.5 1990.7 115.5 2009 105.2 593.05 2143.4 237.6 2180 216.2
Table 4 Simulation Results on Mobile Client 
 
GUAP and Gong et al’s protocol resulted in closer time intervals; the RSA key 
generation per session makes RSA-EKE slower than GUAP and Gong et al’s. 
Protected OKE and Zhu et al’s protocol performed worse because of their 
precautions against e-residue attack. 
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Figure 17 Average Simulation Results on Mobile Client: GUAP is the best solution to 
strong user authentication problem in cellular phone systems. Zhu et al’s protocol and OKE 
resolves the per session key generation problem, however their precautions against e-residue 
attack (OKE’s solution is still weak) make them unsuitable. 
 
The simulation results show that the GUAP computations can be carried out 
efficiently in a reasonable time by all the parties, either with 512- or 1024-bit 
RSA. The load on the VLR is particularly low, as a result of the design 
decision to use symmetric key encryption between the VLR and HLR.  
 
Zhu et al.’s protocol seems to be significantly slower. However it must be 
noted that this protocol was designed for a somewhat more restricted setting 
where the mobile device does not have a priorly established trust with the 
server and cannot have the server’s public key installed securely beforehand. 
Nevertheless, we included it in the simulation experiments due to its 
significance as the only strong password protocol designed specifically for 
constrained mobile devices. 
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7. Conclusion 
 
GSM is widely used over the world. If user authentication becomes possible 
for mobile users, everybody will be able to reach their accounts without their 
SIM card. People can redirect their calls through Internet, or reach their 
accounts through anybody’s phone only by entering their username and 
password. We have presented a strong user authentication protocol for GSM 
that permits user authentication to the standard. Our protocol is inspired by 
strong authentication protocols for weak secrets [1, 5]. Our main goal is to 
break the dependency on SIM cards for authentication in GSM and to make the 
standard more flexible for users. The design takes into consideration the 
computational restrictions of the mobile subscribers. It also enables 
authentication of VLR by both mobile subscriber and HLR. Besides; easy, fast, 
and trusted key disabling can be obtained by a minor extension to our protocol.  
 
As a final remark we would like to note that our protocol, although designed 
for GSM, is not particularly specific to GSM and can easily be adapted to any 
other mobile protocol where a user device authenticates itself to its home 
server via a local base station. 
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